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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

POINT I
THERE WAS NO CONSIDERATION FOR THE ALLEGED NOTE AND PARKER
IS, THEREFORE, NOT BOUND BY IT.

POINT II
PAROL EVIDENCE WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED TO DETERMINE THE REAL
NATURE OF THIS TRANSACTION, TO SHOW LACK OF CONSIDERATION AND
ACCOMMODATION STATUS AND BECAUSE OKUBO WAIVED ANY RELIANCE ON
THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE BY HIS OWN INTRODUCTION OF PAROL
EVIDENCE.

POINT III
IN SIGNING THE NOTE, PARKER WAS ACCOMMODATING OKUBO. AN
ACCOMMODATION PARTY I S NOT LIABLE TO THE PARTY ACCOMMODATED.
OKUBO'S FAILURE TO TAKE DELIVERY OF, OR PERFECT A SECURITY
INTEREST I N , THE COLLATERAL DISCHARGED PARKER FROM ANY
OBLIGATION ON THE NOTE.

POINT IV

PARKER SIGNED THE NOTE SUBJECT TO THE CONDITION THAT HE WOULD
BE RELEASED FROM LIABILITY WHEN COLLATERAL FOR THE NOTE WAS
ARRANGED. THAT CONDITION WAS FULFILLED AND PARKER WAS,
THEREFORE, RELEASED.

POINT V
IF THIS WAS A LOAN TRANSACTION, RATHER THAN AN INVESTMENT AS
DETERMINED BY THE LOWER COURT, IT WAS A CONSUMER-RELATED LOAN
SUBJECT TO THE UTAH UNIFORM CREDIT CODE AND, AS SUCH VOID,
UNCONSCIONABLE, AND SUBJECT TO INTEREST LIMITATIONS AND
PENALTIES.

-iv-
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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OP UTAH

HAROLD K. OKUBO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

>

Case No. 20510

GEORGE R. PARKER,
Defendant-Respondent•

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is a suit brought by Harold K. Okubo (hereafter
Okubo) to collect an alleged promissory note in the original
amount of $40,000.00 with interest at 30% per annum signed by
George R. Parker (hereafter Parker).

Parker's Answer

admitted the execution of the alleged note but denied its
validity and enforceability and asserted defenses of lack of
consideration, payment, estoppel, waiver, illegality and
unconscionability.

The defenses of conditional delivery and

accommodation status were tried by the court without objection.

1
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Disposition in the Lower Court
After a trial on September 27, 1984, the lower court
concluded that no consideration had been received by Parker
for signing the note, that the note was not legally sufficient as a note or agreement to answer for the debt of
another and that the complaint should be dismissed on the
merits as no cause of action.

Statement of Facts
Sometime prior to January 14, 1980, Okubo was contacted
by his nephew, Byron Okubo, concerning a possible investment
with Sterling Martell of the Martell Corporation that would
return 30% per year.

Byron Okubo had learned of the invest-

ment opportunity from Parker who was his employer.

On

January 14, 1980, Okubo went to Parker's office to learn more
about the investment.
Parker (R. 14 6) .

There he met with his nephew and

In response to Okubofs questions Parker

told Okubo that f,I was a substantial investor, that this was
a broad-ranging investment portfolio that ranged from selling
diamonds in Japan, a dry food processing company that was
established in California, a travel agency, and other
things. And I indicated about the investment, that had I not
been enthusiastic, I would not have invested, and that was
simply the conversation.11

(R.147)

Okubo was also told either by his nephew or Parker that,
if he invested in Martell Corporation, there would be
2
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collateral for his investment in the form of diamonds or
cases of dehydrated chicken chunks to be delivered within
90 days (R. 113-114, 148, 165, 187-188, 197-198).

Because

Okubo knew so little about Martell Corporation, he requested
that Parker sign a note to Okubo as a favor to him.

Parker

agreed to sign an interim note until the collateral was
delivered or established (R. 145, 149, 164, 171-2, 199-200).
Okubo wrote out a check to Sterling Martell for $40,000.00
which was then delivered by Byron Okubo to Sterling Martell
who cashed the check and used the proceeds in his corporation
(R. 204-205).

None of the proceeds went to Parker (R. 148,

167, 205).
A note or agreement from Martell Corporation to Okubo
along with a letter of instruction and information about
collateral for the note or agreement and a receipt for the
collateral was sent to Okubo within 90 days thereafter
(R. 194-197, 207, 228, 231-232).

Okubo did not respond to

the information and took no action to take delivery of the
collateral or to perfect any interest in the collateral
(R. 112, 132, 151-152, 155, 165-166, 191-192).

Okubo

received a $10,000.00 payment from Martell Corporation in
September

of 1980 (R. 105) and possibly other payments

(R. 2 25) .

Some two and one-half years later, in March of

1983, Okubo commenced this action against Parker.

3
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
!•

Okubo had the burden to prove that consideration was

given for the note he seeks to enforce.

The lower court

specifically found there was no consideration and that
finding must be affirmed if there is competent evidence to
support it.

The evidence shows that no money or other

benefit went to Parker.

There is no evidence to show that

any benefit went to Martell Corporation or that any loss was
suffered by Okubo.

Furthermore, to stand as consideration,

any intangible benefit to Parker or detriment to Okubo must
have been regarded by the parties as consideration for the
note and any benefit to Martell must have been at the
instance or request of Parker.
show this0

There is no evidence to

Therefore, the lower court1s finding must be

affirmed.
lie

The lower court did not allow parol evidence to

vary the terms of the note except evidence introduced by
Okubo himself and evidence to which Okubo did not object or
to which he had waived his right to object.

Further, parol

evidence was admissible in this case to show lack of consideration, accommodation status and conditional delivery as
well as the real nature of the transaction.
IIX«

Parker signed the note only as an accommodation to

Okubo and, therefore, has all of the suretyship defenses
available under the law.

Those defenses included (1) an

accommodation party is not liable to the party accommodated
4
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[§70A-3-415 (5) ], (2) The holder discharges the maker if he
unjustifiably impairs any collateral for the note [§70A-3606(1)(b)], and (3) The holder f s refusal of a tender of
payment

(by tendering the collateral) discharges any party

with a right of recourse against the party making the tender
[§70A-3-604(2)].

Under these provisions Parker either has no

liability to Okubo or has been discharged from liability by
Okubo's failure to accept delivery of the collateral or to
perfect a security interest therein.
IV.

The note was delivered to Okubo subject to the

condition that Parker would have no liability thereon after
arrangements were made by Martell for security.

Martell took

steps to provide collateral but Okubo failed or refused to
take delivery of the collateral or to perfect a security
interest therein and should, therefore, be estopped from
claiming the condition has not been fulfilled.
V,

The lower court held this to be an investment

rather than a loan transaction.

However, if this court

should determine that it was a loan, it would be a consumerrelated loan subject to the Utah Uniform Consumer Credit
Code.

Parker has not waived his right to the defenses,

finance charge limitations and penalties provided under that
Code.

If this transaction is considered to be a loan, it

exceeds the finance charge limitations, it was made by an
unauthorized

lender and is void.

Okubo would also be

required to pay penalties and attorney's fees.
5
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Affirmance of

the lower court's judgment based on Points X, II, III or IV,
or for any other reason, would render the arguments of this
Point moot*

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE WAS NO CONSIDERATION FOR THE
ALLEGED NOTE AND PARKER IS, THEREFORE,
NOT BOUND BY IT.
As the appellant has conceded in his brief (p.6), it is
well established that consideration is essential to the
existence of a valid and binding obligation as between the
immediate parties to a note.
§14 3*

10 C.J.S., Bills and Notes

Under the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, want of

consideration is a defense against any person who is not a
holder in due course, §70A-3-306 and 408, U.C.A.
not claimed to be a holder in due course.

Okubo has

While some cases

state that the burden of proof to establish want of consideration is on the maker of the note, Olpin v. Grove Finance
Company, 521 P e 2d 1221, 1223

(Utah, 1974); Alexander

v, DeLaCruz, 545 P. 2d 518, 519 (Utah, 1976), the rule is
more accurately stated in Hudson v. Moon, 42 Utah 377, 130
Pace 774 (1913) , that there is a presumption of valuable
consideration upon production of the note and proof of
signature and the duty of producing evidence to overcome such
presumption then devolves upon the maker which, if done,
6
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overcomes the presumption and requires the holder of the note
to support the presumption by producing evidence showing a
valuable consideration but "the plaintiff on the whole case
has the burden, the onus probandi, of showing by a fair
preponderance of all the evidence a legal and valuable
consideration" (at 130 Pac. 777).
Since the lower court is the trier of fact, the principles of appellate review require this court to view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party
and to uphold the findings of the lower court if there is
evidence in the record to support those findings.

Sharpe

v. American Medical Systems, Inc., 671 P. 2d 185 (Utah,
1983); Knight v. Leigh, 619 P. 2d 1385 (Utah, 1980); Nance
v. City of Provo. 29 U. 2d 340, 509 P. 2d 365 (1973).

The

lower court specifically found that there was no consideration of any kind paid to Parker for signing the note (Finding
of Fact #11, R.73, Conclusion of Law #8, R.74).
is well supported by the evidence.

That finding

Okubo stated he made his

check out to Sterling Martell (R.104, 115), Parker testified
he received none of the money (R.148) and Sterling Martell
testified that he used the entire proceeds and nothing went
to Parker (R.204-205).

Based on that evidence alone, this

court should affirm the lower court's judgment.
However, Okubo has argued in his brief that consideration did exist for the note in the form of benefit to Parker
or Sterling Martell or loss or detriment to Okubo.

7
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That

argument is based upon a quotation from 10 C.J.S., Bills and
Notes §148(a):
"Usually, there is a sufficient consideration if
there is any benefit, profit or advantage to the
promisor, or any loss, detriment, or inconvenience
to the promisee, provided it was so regarded by the
parties, . . . ." (Emphasis Added)
The underlined portion of the quotation was conveniently left
out of Okubo§s brief o

That portion is all-important, of

course, since, if the parties do not regard the benefit or
loss as consideration, it is not sufficient as consideration,

Okubo's brief discusses possible benefits to Parker

and Martell and the possible loss to Okubo but refers to no
evidence in the record to show such benefits or losses and
does not even claim that such benefits or losses were
regarded as consideration for the note by either party as
required by his own authority.
In fact, the evidence indicates the contrary*
no benefit to Parker from this transaction.

There was

Okubo claims

that the investment by him resulted in an "increased likelihood" that Parker would recoup his own investment in Martell
Corporation. This is pure speculation and Okubo refers to no
evidence to support it.

The testimony actually was to the

effect that Okubofs investment would have no effect on
Parker f s investment (R.167-168, 177-178) and that each
investor stood on his own by purchasing a quantity of goods
that he could hold until a return was made by the resale of
those goods*

Each investor acted as a warehouseman with
8
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respect to the goods his funds were used to purchase (R.201203).

Even if there was some remote benefit to Parker, there

is no testimony that any such possible benefit to Parker was
discussed by the parties.

Furthermore, Parker himself

invested additional funds after Okubo (R.168, 179-180) and
similar investments were obtained from at least 100 others
(R.207) so it was not necessary to obtain Okubofs investment
to shore up the company.
Although it might be assumed that Okubo suffered a loss
from his investment, there is no evidence that he suffered a
loss. He did receive at least one payment of $10,000.00 from
Martell but there is no evidence that Okubo took any action
to recover the balance of his investment from Martell or that
such a recovery was impossible.

And again, there is no

testimony that any such potential loss to Okubo was regarded
by the parties as consideration for the signing of the note.
There is further no evidence as to the benefit to
Martell Corporation from the transaction.

Okubo has assumed

such a benefit in his brief but has referred to no evidence
to support that assumption.

And here again, the law relied

upon by Okubo requires that such benefit be given "at the
instance or request of the promisor."
Notes §148 (b).

10 C.J.S., Bills and

Here also, the evidence is to the contrary.

Parker stated that he did not solicit funds for Martell
(R.142) and did not discuss the investment Okubo was to make
(R.147-148).

The investment was arranged through Okubo's
9
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nephew, Byron, who was the instigator of the investment and
the link between Okubo and Parker or Martell (R. 108-109,
110-111, 175, 182, 184-185, 188).
Based upon the rules of appellate review, the finding of
the lower court that there was no consideration for the
signing of the note must be affirmed since there is credible
evidence in the record to support that finding.

In fact

there is substantial evidence in the record to support that
finding and little or none to support Okubo1 s claim that
consideration exists.

POINT II
PAROL EVIDENCE WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED TO DETERMINE
THE REAL NATURE OF THIS TRANSACTION, TO SHOW LACK
OP CONSIDERATION AND ACCOMMODATION STATUS AND
BECAUSE OKUBO WAIVED ANY RELIANCE ON THE PAROL
EVIDENCE RULE BY HIS OWN INTRODUCTION OP PAROL
EVIDENCE.
Okubo has claimed in his brief that the lower court
erred in allowing parol evidence regarding this transaction
because §78-25-16, U.C.Ac, does not allow such evidence.

His

reliance on that provision is misplaced since it governs
evidence as to the content of a writing when the original is
not available.

Here there is no question as to the content

of the note since the original was introduced as Exh-1.

The

real question is whether evidence other than the note itself
may be considered in determining the validity and enforceability of the note.

There are several reasons why such

other evidence was properly admitted in this case.
10
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1.

Okubo himself first introduced evidence outside of

the note.

In identifying the note he stated that it was a

note "that Dr. Parker made out for me to invest in this other
company because I didn't trust the other company and he said
he would back it up" (R.102).

Then Okubo1 s attorney asked

him, "Now, would you briefly tell the court how you came
about getting involved with Dr. Parker on this promissory
note?" (R.103).

Okubo then proceeded to give some of the

details concerning the nature of the transaction.

Okubo1 s

attorney, in his direct examination of Okubo, said, "And tell
us about the conversation that you may have had, if you had
any, with Dr. Parker at the time the note was executed"
(R.104).

These questions, of course, opened up the entire

question of matters outside the contents of the note which
Parker could explore on cross-examination as well as by
testimony from his own witnesses.

On cross-examination Okubo

was asked for further detail about the conversations leading
up to, surrounding and after the execution of the note and
Okubo answered those questions without objection from his
attorney

(R.108).

In fact the testimony continues for 18

pages of the record before an objection based on the parol
evidence rule was raised.

By that time any possible right of

Okubo to rely on the parol evidence rule had been waived.
2.

Lack of consideration is always a defense to a

promissory note as between the parties thereto and that
defense can only be established by parol evidence.
11
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Hawkins

v, McElHanon, 315 P. 2d 667 (Okl., 1957).

As can be seen

from Point I of Okubo's brief, wherein consideration for the
note is claimed to have arisen from the benefit to Parker or
Martell by the investment of Okubo's funds in the Martell
Corporation, parol evidence as to the entire transaction may
be required to determine the existence or lack of consideration .

Furthermore, where the parties to an integrated and

unambiguous contract place their own construction upon it by
their subsequent actions, parol evidence of such actions may
be admitted to determine the intent of the parties. Builough
v. Sims, 16 U. 2d 304, 400 P. 2d 20 (1965).

It is obvious

that Okubo had not made a loan to Parker but had made an
investment with Martell and expected a return on that investment from Martell.

Otherwise, why did he "struggle" to get

repayments from Martell from July to September of 1980
(R. 105, 116) long before the note from Parker was supposed
to be due?

(June 14, 1981 - See Exh. 1)• Parol evidence of

these actions is admissible to show Okubo's own interpretation of his investment.
3S

Okubo has claimed that Parker signed the note as an

accommodation to Okubo (Appellant's Brief, p. 5) and the
lower court specifically found that Parker signed the note as
a "temporary surety" (Conclusion #7, R.74).

Parker's only

purpose in signing the note was as a favor or accommodation
to Okubo (R.164, 171-172).

Parol evidence as to the accommo-

dation status of a party to a note may be introduced as
12
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against anyone but a holder in due course, §70A-3-415(3),
U.C.A.; Mach Lumber Co,. Inc. v. Crystal Associates, Inc., 13
U.C.C. 682 (N.Y., 1973); James Talcott, Inc. v. Fred Ratowsky
Associates, Inc.. 2 U.C.C. Rep. 1134 (Pa., 1965).
"The intention of the parties is determinative of
whether a person signing a negotiable instrument is
an accommodation party, and if the intention of the
parties is not expressed on the instrument itself,
it must be ascertained from the facts and circumstances connected with the transaction and the
parties to it." 90 A.L.R. 3d 342, Who is Accommodation Party, at 347.
4.

If there is no evidence in the record that the note

by itself was not a fully integrated statement of the intent
of the parties, the parol evidence rules does not bar the
consideration of other statements and writings which formed a
part of the total agreement.

See Aird Insurance Agency

v. Zions First National Bank, 612 P. 2d 341 (Utah, 1980) ,
where other evidence outside of an irrevocable and absolute
assignment of a passbook was considered in holding that the
assignment was neither irrevocable nor absolute.

See also

Corev v. Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 25 P. 2d 940 (1933), where, in
holding a deed, absolute on its face, to be a conditional
conveyance, the court stated, at 25 P. 2d 946:
" . . . parol evidence, extrinsic circumstances, and
the relationship of the parties may be resorted to,
not for the purpose of varying the terms of the
written instrument, but for the purpose of showing
the object and purpose for which the conveyance was
made."
Those cases certainly cover the circumstances of this case
where the note was but a small part of the total transaction,

13
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had no integration clause and was at most intended to be an
interim arrangement with limited validity.

The relationship

of the parties and extrinsic circumstances clearly show
that.

Because the cases cited on page 8 of the Appellantfs

Brief do not involve such circumstances and concern fully
integrated agreementsf they are not applicable here.
The lower court did not allow parol evidence to vary the
terms of the note, except evidence introduced by Okubo
himself and evidence to which Okubo did not object or to
which he had waived his right to object.

Parol evidence was

further admissible in this case to show lack of consideration
and accommodation status as well as the real nature of the
transaction.

Therefore, there was no error committed by the

lower court.

POINT III
IN SIGNING THE NOTE, PARKER WAS ACCOMMODATING
OKUBO. AN ACCOMMODATION PARTY IS NOT LIABLE TO THE
PARTY ACCOMMODATED. OKUBO»S FAILURE TO TAKE
DELIVERY OF, OR PERFECT A SECURITY INTEREST IN, THE
COLLATERAL DISCHARGED PARKER FROM ANY OBLIGATION ON
THE NOTE.
As has already been discussed, Parker's only purpose in
signing the note was to accommodate Okubo,

That was the

finding of the lower court (Conclusion #7, R.74) and there is
ample evidence to support that finding.

Parker stated that

he signed the note as a favor and accommodation to Okubo
(R.164,171-172) and Okubo stated that he made the investment
because Parker signed the note (R.104, 127, 185, 199-200).
14
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It is further obvious that Parker was accommodating Okubo and
not any other party when he signed the note from the fact
that the entire conversation regarding the signing of the
note was only between Parker and Okubo(R.103-104) and Martell
knew nothing about the note until later (R.218-219).

Martell

signed a note to Okubo himself as verification of the fact
that he, or his corporation, was the primary obligor and that
Parker's note was intended as an accommodation
2 31-23 2) •

(R.205, 207,

Martell testified that Okubo was looking to him

for payment and knew that any repayment was to come from him
(R.235-236),
to Okubo.

As an accommodation party Parker is not liable

Section 70A-3-415(5), U.C.A., provides as follows:

"An accommodation party is not liable to the party
accommodated, and if he pays the instrument has a
right of recourse on the instrument against such
party.,f
The party accommodated in this case was Okubo.

The

foregoing provision clearly states that Parker has no
liability to Okubo and that result, although anomalous, is
the holding of several cases.

See Mach Lumber Co., Inc. v.

Crystal Associates, Inc., supra; James Talcott, Inc. v. Fred
Rotowsky Associates, Inc., supra; White v. Household Finance
Corp., 302 N.E. 2d 828, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 858 (Ind. App. 1973).
That should also be the result in this case and the lower
court has committed no error in so finding.
Other provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code fully
support the lower court's judgment.

Section 70A-3-606,

U.C.A., provides:
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(1) The holder discharges any party to the instrument to the extent that without such party's
consent the holder
«

©

.

9

(b) unjustifiably impairs any collateral for
the instrument given by or on behalf of the party
or any person against whom he has a right of
recourse.
The lower court found that Parker signed the note "until the
delivery to plaintiff of security for his investment11
(Finding #7, R.73) and as "a temporary surety until the
delivery of security" (Conclusion #7, R.74)*

Those findings

are well supported in the record (R. 145# 149). Martell took
action to deliver collateral to Okubo (R.194-197, 207, 228,
231-232) but Okubo did not respond and took no action to take
delivery of the collateral or to perfect any security
interest therein (R.112, 132, 151-152, 155, 165-166, 191192) e

He was informed that the collateral would be stored

for him if he so desired (R.192, 195, 232-233) but he did
nothing to verify or agree to that arrangement.

The lower

court sustained Okubofs objection to a question asked to
determine if the collateral was still available (R.236).
Okubo was well aware that he was to receive collateral
for his investment (R.112, 165) and that Parker's note was to
be in effect only until the collateral could be arranged.
His failure to take any steps to accept the collateral or to
perfect an interest in it was not only contrary to the
agreement between Parker and Okubo but also an impairment of
the collateral which discharged any obligation of Parker to
16
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him as provided by §70A-3-606(l) (b) , U.C.A.

If Parker had

any obligation to Okubo on the note and paid that note, he
would have the right to be subrogated to Okubofs rights in
the collateral to secure his own outlay of funds.

Okubofs

failure to protect that collateral has prejudiced Parker's
position and Okubo should not be allowed to pass the consequences of his own failures on to Parker,

That is the

principle underlying that section and the resulting discharge
of Parker is fair, reasonable and required by the law.

See

Farmers State Bank of Oakley v. Cooper, 227 Kan. 547, 608
P. 2d 929 (1980) .

This impairment of collateral defense is

available even if the collateral is not in the possession or
control of Okubo.

Beneficial Finance Co. of Norman v.

Marshall, 551 P. 2d 315 (Okl. app. 1976).
Another view of this transaction is that Parker's note
to Okubo was to be considered paid upon delivery of, or
perfection of an interest in, the collateral.
consistent with the understanding of the parties.

That is
Section

70A-3-604, U.C.A., provides:
"(1) Any party making tender of full payment to a
holder when or after it is due is discharged to the
extent of all subsequent liability for interest,
costs and attorney's fees.
(2) The holder's refusal of such tender wholly
discharges any party who has a right of recourse
against the party making the tender."
Under §70A-3-415(5), U.C.A., quoted above, Parker would have
recourse against Martell if it was determined that Martell
was the party accommodated.

Martell made a tender of the
17
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collateral to Okubo which, pursuant to the condition under
which Parker signed the note, represented a "tender of full
payment" to Okubo„

Okubo's refusal of that tender "wholly

discharges" Parker under §70A-3-604(2)•

POINT IV
PARKER SIGNED THE NOTE SUBJECT TO THE CONDITION
THAT HE WOULD BE RELEASED PROM LIABILITY WHEN
COLLATERAL FOR THE NOTE WAS ARRANGED.
THAT
CONDITION WAS FULFILLED AND PARKER WAS# THEREFORE,
RELEASED«
As is established by the evidence and the findings
referred to in Point III, supra, Parker signed the note
"until the delivery to plaintiff fo security for his investment" and as "a temporary surety until the delivery of
security" (Finding #7, R*73, Conclusion #7, R.74).
constitutes conditional delivery.

That

When the condition was

fulfilled by arrangements for the security, Parker was no
longer obligated on the note.

In Martineau v, Hanson, 47

Utah 549, 155 Pac* 432 (1916), a note was not to become due
until the maker received a payment from a third party*

In

holding the note to be unenforceable, this court stated (at
155 Pace 435):
"The question was not one of want of, or failure
of, consideration. The question was whether the
note in question was conditionally delivered or
note If it was delivered upon a condition precedent and the condition was not fulfilled, then the
note did not constitute an enforceable contract,
and that is the end of the matter•"
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In this case the note was delivered upon a condition subsequent and that condition was fulfilled.

The same principle

applies and the note was no longer an enforceable contract.
The fact that Okubo did not actually take delivery of
the collateral was a result of his own failure or refusal.
Everything was done for him.

He needed only accept the

collateral or take steps to perfect a security interest
therein.

Under the law he is estopped from claiming any

advantage based on his own failure.

Therefore, the collater-

al must be deemed to have been delivered and the condition on
which the note was given fulfilled.

Parker was no longer

bound by the conditional note.

POINT V
IP THIS WAS A LOAN TRANSACTION, RATHER THAN AN
INVESTMENT AS DETERMINED BY THE LOWER COURT, IT WAS
A CONSUMER-RELATED LOAN SUBJECT TO THE UTAH UNIFORM
CREDIT CODE AND, AS SUCH VOID, UNCONSCIONABLE, AND
SUBJECT TO INTEREST LIMITATIONS AND PENALTIES.
Since Okubo sued to recover on a promissory note given
for funds which he had loaned, Parker raised defenses under
the Utah Uniform Consumer Credit Code.

The lower court held

that this transaction was not a loan and was not subject to
the Utah Uniform Credit Code
R.74).

(Conclusions #2, 3 and 4,

Okubo himself claimed it was an investment and not a

loan (R.199-200) and objected to the characterization of the
transaction as a loan (R.119,191).

In view of the holding of

the lower court, the evidence and arguments of Parker
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

regarding the Consumer Credit Code defenses need not be
considered.

However, if it is determined that Parker has any

liability at all, it would have to be based on a conclusion
that this was a loan transaction and these defenses would
become relevanto

These defenses will be only briefly

mentioned here*
The Utah Uniform Consumer Credit Code, at the time this
note was signed, governed not just consumer loans but
consumer-related loans, §70B-3~602,U.C«,Ae, on which finance
charges may not exceed 18% per annum.

This note called for

interest of 30% per annum which would constitute a violation
of the code. Loans carrying finance charges in excess of 18%
per annum made by unauthorized lenders are void, §70B-5-202
(2) « Violations of the code subject the creditor to penalties up to ten times the amount of any excess charges,
§70B-5-202(4), and to payment of attorneyfs fees incurred by
the debtor, §70B-5-202(8).

If the terms of the note are

found to be unconscionable, the court may refuse to enforce
it, §70B-5~108(1), and may award a penalty of $5,000*00 plus
attorneyfs fees, §70B-5-108(4).
In the interest of brevity, further discussion of these
issues is not considered necessary.

However, Parker has not

waived his rights under the Utah Uniform Consumer Credit Code
and is entitled to a full consideration of them in the event
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this court should not affirm the lower court's judgment based
on the arguments in Points I, II, III or IV above or for any
other reason.

CONCLUSION
The lower court found there was no consideration for the
note.

There is competent evidence in the record to support

that finding and, therefore, under the principles of appellate review, it must be upheld.
Parol evidence was properly admitted in this case
because Okubo first introduced such evidence and opened up
the whole area of extrinsic evidence to cross-examination and
clarification by Parkerfs own witnesses.

Parol evidence is

also admissible to show lack of consideration, accommodation
status, conditional delivery and the true nature of the
transaction.

There was no integration clause in the note and

the parties did not intend the note to be an integration of
their total agreement which would preclude the admission of
parol evidence.
The note was obviously signed only as an accommodation
to Okubo which renders Parker, by statute, not liable to
Okubo.

Further, if Parker had any liability to Okubo, he was

discharged from such liability by Okubofs impairment of the
collateral and refusal to accept delivery of the collateral
or to perfect a security interest therein.
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The note was delivered to Okubo subject to the condition
that security be provided*

That condition was fulfilled when

Mart ell attempted to deliver collateral to Okubo.

Okubo *s

failure to take delivery of the collateral or perfect any
security interest therein estops him from claiming the
condition was not fulfilled•

The note was, then, no longer

enforceable.
This transaction was an investment by Okubo, not a
loan*

However, if it were considered to be a loan, Parker is

entitled to all of the defenses and benefits available under
the Utah Uniform Consumer Credit Code. Those benefits would
render the note void and unenforceable and subject Okubo to
the payment of penalties and attorney's fees.

In that event

Parker would want the opportunity to brief those issues in
more detail*
The lower courtfs judgment is well-supported in the
record and should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH

Ralph Ju Mahrsh
Attorneys for Respondent
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